
Weekly Briefing • October 16, 2026
On October 6, SonicWall published a fix for a flaw rated 10 out of 10 in one of its remote-access appliances. Two days later, decoy systems run by outside researchers were already catching attack traffic aimed at it. On October 8, the FBI arrested the co-founder of a firm that negotiates with ransomware groups on behalf of victims, on extortion charges. And Microsoft took down a marketplace that sold phishing kits and fraudulent Microsoft 365 accounts by the listing, behind roughly a billion phishing messages.
The thread this week is trust. In each story the damage runs through something that had already been trusted: the box that decides who gets onto your network from outside, the reputation of an old email account or a familiar name, and, if the charges hold up, the outside firm hired to sit on the victim's side of a ransom negotiation.
SonicWall disclosed CVE-2026-102255 on October 6, a flaw in the sign-in portal of its SMA 1000 Series, the appliances that let remote staff reach the office network. It carries a score of 10 out of 10, the maximum. Someone with no password can make the appliance send requests on their behalf, and because those requests come from the appliance itself, systems inside the network that refuse traffic from the internet accept them. SonicWall said there was "currently no evidence" of exploitation. Defused reported attack traffic against its SonicWall decoy systems starting October 8, and Previdian reported attempts against its own sensors on October 9. SonicWall has released a hotfix. This is the same product line the Inc ransomware gang broke into in July through two earlier flaws, CVE-2026-15409 and CVE-2026-15410, before fixes for them existed.
SonicWall says the SSL VPN built into its firewalls and its smaller SMA 100 Series are not affected, so if that is how your staff connect from home, this particular flaw is not yours. The pattern is. A remote-access box decides who gets onto your network and knows where everything inside it lives. It generally will not run the endpoint protection installed on your computers, so whatever happens on it shows up only in the logs the box itself keeps. The same week, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 described attackers who hid code in the memory of Fortinet firewalls, where it left nothing on disk, and who shut off the firewalls' own logging along the way. More on that one below.
Key Insight
A patch closes the way in. It does nothing about anything that came through before it was installed, so a remote-access box that sat on the internet unpatched gets treated as compromised until someone shows otherwise, and the passwords and certificates it held get changed either way.
There is a second cost that arrives whether or not anything goes wrong. Joe Toomey, vice president of underwriting security at the cyber insurer Coalition, told Dark Reading that edge devices produce a disproportionate share of claims and that SSL VPN devices "are almost uniformly bad." Coalition prices policies partly on what its underwriters can see exposed from outside your company and on the claims history of the vendor that made the box, so at least at one insurer, your remote-access equipment shows up in your renewal quote. For your firm, that comes down to two questions for whoever manages your firewall: what remote-access equipment can the internet reach, and when an emergency fix like this one comes out, does the work stop at the patch, or does it include changing every password, shared secret and certificate the box was holding? Full analysis here: SonicWall SMA SSRF Flaw CVE-2026-102255 Draws Exploitation Attempts Within Days of Disclosure.
Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit has taken down YAM Store, a marketplace that sold phishing kits alongside fraudulent Microsoft and Google accounts, as reported by CSO Online. Microsoft ties it to roughly 1 billion phishing messages aimed at more than 75,000 organizations, more than 750 million of them sent to Microsoft customers, and "tens of millions of dollars" for the people running it. Buyers shopped it like any other store: listings sorted by account age, subscription level and type, including school and nonprofit accounts, because an established account in an .edu or .org tenant has a sending reputation that a brand-new domain does not. The sellers also bought up domains that real organizations had let expire, rebuilt them to look active, and used them to obtain Microsoft 365 accounts to resell. The kits came with more than 2,300 ready-made pages impersonating healthcare providers, tax agencies, banks, courier services and police departments in more than 150 countries, and they were built to show a blank page to security scanners while the intended target saw a convincing sign-in screen.
Treat the takedown as disruption, not removal. The kits sold there, CoGUI, Haozi and the newer Iron Man System, can be sold elsewhere, and the people who bought them are customers who will shop somewhere else, so what reaches your staff's inboxes is unlikely to change much. What should change is how you think about one bad click. A password typed into one of these pages becomes inventory: the buyer may use the mailbox for invoice fraud this month and sell the same access to a ransomware crew the next, and the whole time, the sign-ins look like your employee's. The cleanup rule from earlier briefings still applies: end the stolen session, don't just change the password. The step that changes the economics is moving the accounts that matter most, starting with the owner's and whoever approves payments, to passkeys, so a password typed into a fake page is no longer enough to sign in and stops being worth selling. Full analysis here: Microsoft Disrupts YAM Store Phishing-as-a-Service Behind 1 Billion Messages.
The FBI arrested Edward Dubrovsky in Pennsylvania on October 8 on cyber extortion and conspiracy charges tied to its investigation of ShinyHunters, a data-theft and extortion group the FBI says has taken more than $70 million from victims this year. Dubrovsky co-founded Cypfer, a Canadian firm that negotiates with ransomware and extortion groups on behalf of the companies they hit, and is now associated with another Canadian firm, CyberSteward. He had been in Philadelphia for a cyber insurance conference where Cypfer was listed as the largest sponsor. The complaint is sealed, the case has moved to the Eastern District of Texas, and nothing has been proven. Sources told KrebsOnSecurity that charges against people at other negotiation firms may follow.
ShinyHunters does not encrypt anything. It phishes employees, signs in to cloud services with stolen passwords, pulls the data out through the application's own features, and threatens to publish it. When the break-in is that quiet, the money is made in the conversation afterward, and the negotiator on the victim's side of that conversation typically knows what was taken, what the insurance covers, and the number above which the victim will not pay. Two weeks ago the point here was that the list of businesses holding your patient or client records is longer than your list of software vendors. Add one more: whoever worked your last incident. If your firm has ever paid or negotiated over stolen data, find out who actually sat in that chat on your behalf, keep every record of the engagement, and tell your breach attorney and your cyber insurer this week rather than after a subpoena arrives. If it never has, the firm that would handle it often comes from your insurer's approved panel or through your breach attorney, not from a choice you make in the middle of an incident, so ask your broker at renewal which firms those are and how the carrier vets them. Full analysis here: FBI Arrests Founder of Ransomware Negotiation Firm Tied to ShinyHunters.
PEERSTITCH Malware Exploits FortiOS Flaws to Bypass Tagged VPN Session Checks — Unit 42 found an implant that lives only in the running memory of Fortinet firewalls and lets the attackers' VPN connections skip the firewall's own security checks. The group got there by first breaking into the central console a telecommunications managed service provider used to administer more than 500 of those firewalls, through a FortiManager flaw known since late 2024. Fortinet fixed the flaw used to plant the implant in April, but a patched firewall can still be carrying it, a reboot erases the only evidence, and most owners in that position end up rebuilding the device from clean firmware. If someone else manages your firewalls, the console they manage them from is part of your perimeter too.
Four-Byte Write Bug Lets Researchers Run Code in Windows SmartScreen Enclave — Doyensec showed how to run their own code inside the walled-off part of Windows 11 that holds a hashed copy of your sign-in password for SmartScreen's phishing warnings, a region your endpoint protection cannot see into by design. It needs code already running on the PC, the researchers did not show a password being read, and Microsoft says it was not exploited before the September 8 update fixed it. That update is the entire fix. There is no setting that substitutes for it, and a PC that no longer receives Windows updates will never get it.
One Thing to Do This Week
Make a list of every domain name your firm has ever used: the current one, the practice name from before a merger or rename, the old website from before the redesign, anything a former partner registered. Then find the renewal invoice for each one, from your registrar, your web designer or your IT provider, and confirm it is still being paid. The YAM Store sellers bought domains that real organizations had let expire, rebuilt them to look active, and used them to get Microsoft 365 accounts to resell. A name your firm used for years has resale value to someone. If anyone wants to let one lapse to save the renewal fee, the answer is to ask whoever manages your email first. This one needs no help from IT.
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Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms — medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial — since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.

Weekly Briefing • October 2, 2026
A skilled nursing provider in Beachwood, Ohio found an intruder on one of its servers; the notification letters are going to more than 3,000 people. A California law firm found that "limited" patient data had been accessed; the people getting letters are patients of a hospital the firm represents, who never dealt with the firm themselves. A phishing campaign tracked across 351 sandbox runs, 51% of them from the United States, turns one click on a forged DocuSign envelope into a stolen Microsoft 365 session and a remote-control agent on the same person's computer. And a campaign planting fake bank and airline phone numbers across the web is reaching people through the AI assistant they asked, with no email anyone could have flagged.
The thread this week is scope. In every case the incident ended up larger than the mistake that started it, and the cleanup landed on people who never made the mistake.
Two breach notices went out on October 1, both reported by The HIPAA Journal, and neither involved a hospital's own network. Saber Healthcare, which runs skilled nursing, long-term care, and senior rehabilitation facilities out of Beachwood, Ohio, identified unauthorized access to one of its servers on July 27. The review of what was on that server finished August 19, and the answer was the full identity set: names with dates of birth, driver's license or state ID numbers, health insurance and medical information, financial account details, passport numbers, and Social Security numbers. Saber has not published a count; its filings with state attorneys general put the incident above 3,000 people. Buchalter, a law firm headquartered in California, discovered on August 28 that an unauthorized third party had reached patient data belonging to Arrowhead Regional Medical Center, a hospital it provides legal services to. The firm confirmed on September 4 which patients were involved and obtained their contact information on September 21 to start mailing letters. Neither notice names an attacker, and neither reports misuse.
Two weeks ago this briefing covered a practice-management vendor whose breach became a notification obligation at every practice on its platform. The Buchalter case moves that one step further out. A law firm that receives patient records to handle a hospital's legal matter is a business associate under HIPAA. The breach happened at the firm, but the duty to notify patients and the HHS Office for Civil Rights sits with the hospital, so the hospital is drafting letters about an intrusion it never saw, on a server it never configured, on a timeline the firm's investigation set. A business associate typically has up to 60 days from discovery to tell you; many agreements shorten that to 10 or 15 days, so check which yours says before you need it. A third notice in the same reporting, from a dental practice, shows the other side of the problem: one server ran the practice management, dental imaging, and electronic health record software together, so everything the practice knew about every patient, dependents included, sat behind a single door. That practice says its data was encrypted and the attackers are not believed to have the keys. It still had to send the letters.
Key Insight
Breach notification follows the data, not the server: when a law firm, billing company, or imaging vendor holding your patient records is breached, the letters carry your name. And the 60-day clock runs from the day a breach is discovered, not the day the review finishes, which for Saber Healthcare meant three weeks were gone before anyone knew what the server held.
For a medical or dental practice, the list of businesses holding your patient records is longer than your software vendors: the attorney handling a dispute, the billing company, the collections agency, the imaging vendor. For a law firm, you are on the other side of the same arrangement. A hospital's or a practice's records in your matter folders make you the business associate, and state bar confidentiality rules add a duty to tell affected clients that runs separately from the statute. Either way, the question to be able to answer this month is who holds your records and how fast they are contractually required to tell you when something happens. Full analysis here: Saber Healthcare and Buchalter Disclose Separate Data Breach Incidents.
If you have read this briefing since August, you have seen the first half of this story three times: a phishing page walks someone through a genuine Microsoft sign-in, MFA and all, and the attacker walks away holding the finished session, so changing the password afterward does not put them out. Researchers at ANY.RUN, reported by The Hacker News, tracked a campaign they call CSuite across 351 sandbox analyses, 51% of them submitted from the United States, that does exactly that and then adds the second half. The lures are the documents your office handles every day: pages branded as Adobe, DocuSign, Zoom, Google Meet, Dropbox, and Microsoft 365, including a forged DocuSign envelope sent in the name of a law firm. One branch of the page pushes the victim into a device-code sign-in: a short code appears, the victim types it into the real Microsoft login page, completes MFA for real, and the attacker's waiting software collects the tokens. The other branch drops a small script file. In one run ANY.RUN watched, an Adobe-themed lure delivered a BAT file that elevated its own privileges and installed ScreenConnect, a genuine remote-control product that IT departments buy. Action1, another legitimate management tool, shows up in the same campaign. Both are signed by their vendors, register themselves as Windows services the way a proper install would, and call home to infrastructure most firewalls already allow. The organizations hit so far cluster in technology, manufacturing, government, and consulting, but the envelope carried a law firm's name, and a signature request from a law firm is an ordinary Tuesday for a medical office or an accounting practice.
The rule from the August 21 briefing still holds and covers the first branch exactly: a code you are asked to type into a Microsoft sign-in page is the attack. The September 4 rule covers the second: nothing you did not go looking for gets to install remote-access software. What is new is what happens after someone has already clicked. Resetting the password leaves the stolen session working. Revoking the session leaves the remote-control agent running on the workstation, with its own connection out. A suspected phish in this campaign is two incidents, one in the Microsoft 365 account and one on the computer, and whoever handles your IT needs to hear it that way, because a cleanup that closes only one leaves a working path back in. Full analysis here: CSuite Phishing Steals Microsoft 365 Sessions and Deploys ScreenConnect RMM.
Ariel Simon at Vigilance Security documented a campaign, covered in this week's ThreatsDay roundup from The Hacker News, that does not phish anyone. It floods the web with optimized posts, PDFs, reviews, and fake support pages so that when someone asks ChatGPT, Gemini, or Google's AI Overview for a company's support line, the assistant pulls the attacker's page into the answer. The content is planted wherever anyone can publish and the ranking is good: Google Sites, GitHub Pages, WordPress, and Blogger; fundraiser, job, and event platforms; reviews on Yelp and Apple Maps. What comes back is fraudulent phone numbers, email addresses, and login pages for Delta, Lufthansa, Qatar Airways, Chase, Bank of America, Airbnb, TripAdvisor, and hundreds of other brands. The assistant presents it as a clean answer with the web address stripped out, so the things a person would normally check, the domain, the look of the page, the sender, are not there to check.
Think about who at your practice looks up a phone number in a hurry: the bookkeeper calling the bank about a declined payment, the office manager calling the payroll company, whoever is on the phone with a software vendor when it stops working. If the number came from an AI answer, the person on the other end may be the attacker, and the caller will volunteer the account number, the verification details, and the reason for the call without being asked twice. No email arrived, so nothing got flagged, forwarded, or reported, and the first sign is money moving or a login being used from somewhere new. Every account recovery that starts with a phone call, and every remote-support session that starts with a phone call, runs through whichever number got dialed. Full analysis here: ThreatsDay Roundup Covers AI Search Poisoning and One-Click Code Execution.
From the same roundup: Exvicy, a ClickFix kit sold as a subscription — Sekoia found it advertised on a Russian-language crime forum since May 26 at $1,200 a month, raised to $2,000 in August. It works through hacked WordPress sites showing a fake Cloudflare "verify you are human" box that tells the visitor to paste a command into the Windows Run dialog. The September 4 rule covers it word for word; the change is that this is now a product with a price list, so expect more of it.
Executive Threat Detection Extends Account Monitoring to Leadership Credentials — Cisco Talos launched a monthly service that watches the accounts of up to 10 named executives, on the reasoning that leadership identities draw attacks built for them while enterprise tooling is tuned for the average user. A practice with twenty staff will not buy a Talos retainer, but the logic transfers: the owner's mailbox and the office manager's are the two with approval authority, the assistant with delegate access to the owner's calendar is the way in, and Talos's own advice is a written rule that every payment instruction gets verbal confirmation on a known number with no exception for the boss, which is the sentence from the September 18 briefing.
AI Agents Trigger Runaway Costs for Enterprises Running Automated Workflows — OWASP now ranks "unbounded consumption" sixth in its 2026 list of top risks for AI applications, and Forcepoint's Jyotika Singh describes the failure plainly: the service stays up and keeps answering while the bill climbs past anything budgeted, with no alert because no single request looks wrong. This is a developer's problem at enterprise scale, but one line applies to any office that has put an AI tool on a company card: an AI tool that acts on its own is a privileged account nobody provisioned, so somebody should own its spending cap, and the cap should be a hard limit, not an email that arrives after the money is gone.
One Thing to Do This Week
Make the real phone list. Take the numbers for your bank, your payroll provider, your practice-management or case-management vendor, and your IT provider from the back of your card, your statements, and the portals you already sign in to, print them, and put the sheet where the phones are. Then give your staff the rule that goes with it: a phone number or a login link that comes from ChatGPT, Gemini, a Google AI answer, or a search result does not get used for anything involving money or an account. If the sheet does not have the number, the call waits until it does. This week's campaign planted fake numbers for Chase, Bank of America, and Delta exactly where a hurried search would find them, and the person who dials one hands over account details to someone who never had to send a phishing email. Ten minutes, no help from IT.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read — what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms — medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial — since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.

Weekly Briefing • September 18, 2026
Nothing this week came through the firewall. The most expensive item was an email with no attachment, no link, and a clean authentication record. The one with the most medical records attached happened on a network in San Francisco that belongs to a software company most patients have never heard of. The third is how client files can leave a practice through a consent screen, in about the time it takes to click Allow.
Your security controls sit around your network. All three of these happened outside it — in your payment approval process, in a vendor's building, and in a browser tab. Here's what happened, and what it means for how your firm operates.
Between August 3 and 5, Microsoft tracked a single campaign of more than a million emails, 87.7 percent of them landing in US inboxes. Each one impersonated an executive at the company receiving it and asked accounts payable to process an ACH payment of just under $50,000. Underneath the executive's signature sat a ServiceNow subscription invoice: branding, invoice number, issue and due dates, itemized lines, and bank details pointing at accounts the attacker controlled. Microsoft found no evidence that ServiceNow, or any other company named in those emails, was compromised. The whole operation ran on a lookalike domain registered on July 31, days before the first message went out.
Here is why filtering did not stop it. There was no attachment to scan and no link to check, because the invoice was drawn directly into the body of the email as HTML. The executive's name appeared only in the display name, the signature, and the reply-to label, while the message itself was sent through a real, working third-party email service. SPF, DKIM, and DMARC all check the sending service, and the sending service was legitimate, so the mail passed every authentication test and arrived with no warning banner attached to it. The fraud lived entirely in the parts a person reads and a filter does not.
Key Insight
Every signal that made that invoice look approved — the name in the From field, the signature block, the invoice layout, the forwarded thread underneath it — was typed by the person asking for the money. None of it required access to anything you own.
Microsoft also found the fingerprints of generative AI in how the templates were assembled: heavy HTML commenting, near-identical structure across samples, the same invoice details reused while the company and executive names changed for each target. That is mass production, and it means the version aimed at a twelve-person practice costs the sender no more than the one aimed at a hospital system. Microsoft listed IT services, business advisory, and consumer goods among the industries hit, and nothing in the method is specific to any of them. The tells that survived are human ones: the quoted "forwarded" conversation carries no date headers, which genuine forwarded mail always has; the subject lines use phrases like "due bill" and a misspelled "ACH Parment"; and in one thread the CEO asks not to be copied, then announces in the next message that he is sending it himself. Tell whoever opens your mail to read the thread, not the signature. Full analysis here: AI-Assisted Executive Impersonation Fuels Invoice Fraud at Organizations.
zHealth, a San Francisco company selling cloud practice management and electronic health records software, has reported that 118,563 people had information exposed: names, medical information, and health insurance information, varying by person. Someone was inside zHealth's network between January 20 and January 21 of this year, roughly one day. The company did not learn that information may have been copied until around June 15. The review establishing whose data was involved finished on September 3. Intrusion to finished answer: about eight months. Affected people are being offered twelve months of single-bureau credit monitoring. zHealth has not said how the attacker got in.
If your practice runs on a hosted EHR or practice management platform, that timeline is part of what you bought. Your patients' records sat in a building you do not own, the window opened and closed before anyone noticed, and your first notice arrives in a letter you had no hand in writing. The shape repeats across the same set of disclosures: a benefits administrator traced its breach to a single employee email account and still reported Social Security numbers exposed, and one intrusion at a credentialing vendor reached about 75 of its customers at once. One break-in at a vendor becomes a notification obligation at every practice on the platform.
Two things follow from that. The call worth making this month is to your EHR or practice management vendor, asking in writing which of your patient records sit in their environment and how quickly they commit to telling you when something happens. Your business associate agreement should say how quickly they must tell you. The second is what you tell patients who ask. Credit monitoring watches for new credit accounts being opened. It does not watch claims submitted to a health plan or prescriptions filled in someone else's name, which is what medical identity theft looks like. The check that finds that is reading the explanation of benefits statement line by line. Full analysis here: Health Records Vendor Discloses Data Breach Affecting 118,000 Individuals.
Intezer reviewed roughly 16.9 million enterprise security alerts and found about 73,000 tied to AI tools and agents, a volume that grew 685 percent between February and June this year. Sorted by outcome, 94.1 percent were noise, 5.8 percent were genuine exposure, and 0.02 percent were real attacks. That headline is about alert fatigue inside large security teams. The second finding is the one that applies if you have eleven people and no security team.
A large share of AI use never produces a security alert at all, because nothing runs on the machine. Somebody grants a third-party AI application consent to their Microsoft 365 account, or pastes a document into a chat window. Both move your information to an outside company, and neither one looks like an event to any tool watching the endpoint. The researchers saw that: OAuth consent granted to ChatGPT across several customer tenants, first sign-in events for OpenAI, and at one customer a cluster of data-protection alerts for uploads into generative AI tools. For a firm like yours, client files and contract terms sent to a processor nobody approved is a disclosure question.
Three questions you can answer this month without buying anything: which AI applications currently hold standing access to your Microsoft 365 tenant, and who approved them; whether the free tier your staff signed into permits prompts to be retained for training; and whether your engagement letters or patient consents cover sending that material to a third party. In the environments we manage, a consent grant handing an outside application standing access to mail or files can show up as an identity finding rather than disappearing into tenant logs, which is the only place that activity leaves a trace. The same research also found AI brand names being used as bait: an invoice fraud lure citing a supposed Anthropic approval to justify a large payment, a fake Gemini Ads invitation, and an "OpenAI Partner Summit 2026" invite delivered through genuine Zoom infrastructure. Those land in your finance inbox, not with your IT provider, which is where this briefing started. Full analysis here: Enterprise AI Adoption Reshapes SOC Detection for Claude, Codex and Cursor.
China-Linked Actors Exploit Chrome and Windows Zero-Day Chain to Deploy GRIMWEDGE — Last week's briefing noted that two of September's patched flaws were already being exploited. Volexity has now shown what one of them, CVE-2026-85880, was being used for: a chain of three bugs, two in Chrome and that one in Windows, that turns a single click into code running on the machine. The targets were non-governmental organizations, so this is not aimed at your practice. Two details are, though. The lure linked to a genuine US university website and abused a flaw on that site to bounce visitors onward, so hovering over the link showed a real .edu domain and told the reader nothing. And Chrome downloads its update in the background but does not run the new version until the browser is restarted, which means an inventory report saying every machine is on the current version is not the same as every machine running it. Anyone who has kept forty tabs open for three weeks is still on the old one. Closing and reopening the browser is all it takes to finish the Chrome update.
Fake AI Trading Agent Steals Crypto Wallet Passwords and Deploys XWorm — HP spent April to June tracking a website advertising an autonomous AI trading agent, and what it installed is the useful part. The download contained a genuine Microsoft-signed Windows utility, renamed "Trading Agent.exe," whose only job was to satisfy the reputation check so Windows raised no warning, plus an attacker library beside it that the signed program obligingly loaded. The same research followed invoice-themed campaigns from the same toolkit to XWorm, a remote access tool that gives an operator hands-on control of the machine, and to stealers that read saved browser passwords. Two of the signed installers HP examined change the browser's default search engine and keep the change after they are uninstalled. A signature tells you who built a file. It does not tell you what the file does.
One Thing to Do This Week
Write one sentence and hand it to whoever pays your invoices: "Any invoice over an amount we set, and any request to change where a payment goes, gets confirmed by phone on the number already in our records before it is paid — including when the request comes from me." Say that last part out loud to them. This fraud works because a clerk who follows the rule is, in that moment, questioning the owner, and the rule only holds if it came from the owner first. The number in the invoice, the number in the signature block, and the number in the email footer do not count; the point is to move the conversation onto a line the sender does not control. Microsoft's campaign asked for just under $50,000, and many finance teams set the threshold somewhere in the low five figures. This takes one conversation and a note above the desk.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read — what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms — medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial — since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.

Weekly Briefing • September 11, 2026
Three attacks this week, and in every one of them the part a security tool would have inspected was legitimate. A phone call talked a help desk into resetting an employee's second factor, so the sign-in that followed was one the identity system had just approved. A phishing page was never hosted on any server; the victim's own browser assembled it in memory at the end of a redirect chain that ran almost entirely through Microsoft. And a remote access trojan arrived as a PDF, opened a real legal brief from a university website as cover, and was flagged by 0 of 76 antivirus engines on the day it was analyzed.
For three weeks this briefing has said the session is what attackers are after. This week is about what that does to the tools most firms rely on. Filters, blocklists, and antivirus all work by finding something bad to point at, and none of these attacks left one. Here's what happened, and what it means for how your firm runs.
Health-ISAC, the threat-sharing center for the health sector, warned its members in July about a rise in successful attacks by ShinyHunters, a group that steals data and demands payment to keep it off its leak site. There is no ransomware in this, no locked workstation, no downed EHR. The victims it names run across the sector: the device makers Medtronic and iRhythm, One Medical, DentaQuest in dental benefits, AdaptHealth in home medical equipment, and Hims & Hers in telehealth. The way in is a phone call. The caller reaches the help desk, or whoever handles account access, gets through the verification questions, and asks for a password reset, an MFA reset, or a new device enrolled on the account. In one recent health-sector incident the group said it called several employees before one Microsoft Entra account gave way, then pulled data out of Microsoft 365 and SharePoint.
What makes it fast is what the attacker sees after signing in. The single sign-on dashboard, whether Okta, Entra, or Google, lists every application that account can reach: Microsoft 365, SharePoint, Dropbox, Salesforce, and whatever else the firm has connected. The attacker does not need to scan, work across the network or escalate privileges, because the dashboard does the reconnaissance. The downloads run at cloud speed, and the first sign anyone sees is the message saying the data is already gone. Nothing was written to a workstation and no process ran on a managed laptop, so endpoint protection has nothing to examine. The session was one the identity system approved, on a device the help desk had just enrolled through its own reset procedure. Clinical systems keep running the whole time.
Key Insight
Whoever can reset a password or a second factor at your practice is part of the perimeter. That reset procedure carries the same weight as a firewall rule, and it is usually run by someone judged on how quickly the call gets closed.
For a firm your size, the help desk is your IT provider, or the office manager who set the Microsoft accounts up in the first place. The control Health-ISAC puts first costs nothing: no password reset, MFA reset, or device enrollment is completed on the inbound call. Whoever takes the call hangs up and calls back on the number already on file, and anyone with admin rights needs a manager's approval on top. If patient records were in that SharePoint, HIPAA requires notice to the affected individuals and to the HHS Office for Civil Rights whether you pay or not. Paying does not return the data or remove the obligation. The sequence that precedes an export is a reset, then a new device, then bulk downloads, and each step on its own is a login the tenant considers valid. The full detection list and the 30-to-60-day hardening plan are in the write-up: Health-ISAC Warns ShinyHunters Steals Healthcare Data in Rising Attacks.
Barracuda's researchers documented a phishing campaign in which the fake Microsoft login page is never hosted anywhere. The email is a DocuSign-style signature request with a calendar invite attached. The link goes to Microsoft's genuine sign-in endpoint. A crafted redirect parameter then hands the session to Microsoft Teams, which loads a file from an outside content domain, and from there the victim's browser assembles the login form in its own memory as a "blob" address, a temporary pointer that exists only inside that tab. Every hop your mail filter, link rewriter, or web proxy can check resolves to Microsoft. There is no lookalike domain to register and no web server to take down, because there is no page until it reaches the user's machine.
The controls most firms have already paid for are keyed to a hosted page and a suspicious domain, and this chain has neither. It also doesn't sit still. The page stays connected to the operator through a background script and a messaging channel, so what the victim sees can be changed mid-session, and a sandbox can be shown something different from what a real employee sees at the same link. Barracuda found configuration for a centrally managed platform running across many victims at once. One-time codes and push approvals are exposed here, since the operator relays what the person types as they type it, and the sign-in that results is logged as successful and policy-compliant. When the tab closes, the page is gone: no URL to report, no copy to preserve as evidence, and an investigation rebuilt from sign-in and mailbox audit records instead. Barracuda's first recommendation is phishing-resistant MFA, a passkey or a FIDO2 hardware key, because it binds the login to the real site and a form assembled in memory has nothing usable to relay. The staff rule is simpler: a signature request nobody was expecting gets checked with the sender by phone before anyone signs in, even when the address bar shows Microsoft. The detection signals and the order to apply the controls in: Attackers Build Phishing Pages That Exist Only Inside Victims' Browsers.
Huntress found tampered Exodus cryptocurrency wallet installers on four unrelated customer networks between late July and mid-August. Three of the four were hit on August 18, within 85 minutes of each other, by an installer compiled the day before. Nobody in those offices was shopping for a crypto wallet. What they opened was a document that arrived through the browser: a file named to end in .pdf.js, which Windows displays as a PDF because it hides known file extensions by default, or a ZIP holding a single script, run from inside Explorer's compressed-folder view without ever being extracted. Two of the victims believed they were opening work material. One got a marketing ebook. One got a legal brief, pulled live from Georgetown Law's website. Both documents were real and opened normally, and both were hosted on domains nobody had a reason to question. In the background the script installed a genuine copy of the Exodus wallet, made sure it never showed a window, and used it to load a remote access trojan straight into memory. At the time of analysis, 0 of 76 antivirus engines on VirusTotal flagged the installer.
The wallet was packaging. What runs inside it is a general-purpose remote access toolkit: a stealer that takes passwords, cookies, and autofill data out of Chrome, Edge, and Firefox; a hidden remote-desktop module that opens a second, invisible Windows desktop and runs a copy of the employee's browser profile on it, so the operator browses as your employee while the employee keeps working on the screen in front of them; and a proxy that sends the attacker's traffic out through your firm's own internet address. It relaunches every hour through a scheduled task registered in a way that leaves no command line behind, and it blanks the proxy settings so its traffic never reaches whatever would have inspected it. Its instructions travel through Microsoft's Azure storage service, a domain on nobody's blocklist. For a law office, a brief arriving as a PDF is routine. A stolen cookie from that session carries the operator past single sign-on and MFA and keeps working after the password changes, and the hidden desktop means the bank portal or the practice management system is being used inside a session your employee legitimately opened. Huntress's hardening list is short and none of it is exotic: show file extensions so a .pdf.js name reads as what it is, block scripts from running out of the download and temp folders, and stop installers from running out of folders a standard user can write to. All three are policy settings, so ask whoever manages your endpoints whether they are in place. The full chain, the artifacts to hunt for, and the cleanup order: Trojanized Exodus Wallet Installer Delivers Modular RAT via ClickFix Lure.
September 2026 Patch Tuesday Addresses 999 CVEs Including CVE-2026-58611 — Rapid7 calls this by far the most CVEs Microsoft has ever published in a single day, 974 in its own products and 723 of those in Windows, and two are already being exploited. Both let someone who already has a foothold on a PC as a standard user climb to full control of that machine, which is the step that turns one compromised mailbox into the whole network. Two things a practice can act on without reading a CVE: the kernel and driver fixes do nothing until the machine restarts, so an update report that says complete on a laptop nobody has rebooted since Tuesday isn't done; and three older products reach the end in October 2026. Office 2021 leaves support on October 13, the last paid update year for Windows Server 2012 ends the same day, and the paid extended updates for Exchange Server 2016 and 2019, out of support since October 2025, end the same month. Anything still running on them stops getting fixes for flaws like these.
ClickFix Moves Into the Browser With Tampermonkey Cryptocurrency Theft — Last week's briefing covered ClickFix as a command pasted into the Windows Run box. Cisco Talos now has it running inside Chrome: the target pastes JavaScript into the address bar, or a script into the Tampermonkey extension, and the code rewrites what the page shows, in this case swapping cryptocurrency deposit addresses, with its instructions fetched from a public Google Sheet so the traffic looks like Google Docs. The crypto angle won't touch most practices. The mechanism will, because the same script pointed at a payroll portal or a bank site rewrites what an authorized user sees and submits, and a script loaded into a signed-in Chrome profile follows that profile to the home laptop. The control is an allowlist of browser extensions on managed devices, and last week's staff rule now covers "paste this into your browser" as well.
One Thing to Do This Week
Ask one question this week of whoever resets passwords and second factors for your practice, whether that is your IT provider or the person in the office who set the Microsoft accounts up: "If someone calls saying they're me and they're locked out, what do you do?" The answer you want is that they hang up and call you back on the number already on file before anything gets reset. If that isn't the answer, make it the rule this week and put it in writing where the resets happen. Health-ISAC puts that one procedure first among its recommended controls against this group.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read — what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms — medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial — since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.

Weekly Briefing • September 4, 2026
None of the three incidents we tracked this week involved anyone breaking in. In every one, the person who got hit did the install. A web page asked an employee to paste one line into Windows, and they did. A recruiter asked a target to load a meeting app for an interview, and the app was a remote-control tool. And nineteen browser extensions that did exactly what they advertised, one of them for about 80,000 users, turned into credential grabbers through a routine automatic update nobody was asked to approve.
There is no attachment to filter and no exploit to patch in any of that.
Huntress documented the current run of ClickFix attacks, which are built to get past every filter you have. A web page shows a fake "verify you're human" check, or a broken-file error, or a download prompt, and it walks the visitor through opening the Run box (Windows key + R) and pasting what's on the clipboard. The page already put the command there. All the person does is press a few keys. There is no attachment for the mail filter to strip and no download for endpoint protection to block, because your employee typed a command into their own computer, and that is exactly what it looks like.
What runs is an infostealer. It reads every saved password and every session token out of the browser, usually in under a minute, and sends them out. The session token is the record of a login your employee already completed, second factor and all, and replaying it in another browser produces a signed-in session with no MFA prompt at all. Since most firms have put email, files, and the finance and HR systems behind one Microsoft or Google login, one harvested token opens all of them at once. The theft happens on the workstation in under a minute. The damage happens in the cloud, hours or days later, from somewhere else, and it looks like your employee logging in.
Key Insight
A stolen session token is a login your employee already finished, MFA included, now running on someone else's machine.
Huntress describes what that kind of access turns into once someone holds it. A small real estate firm had MFA on every account except the CEO's, removed at his own request. The attacker sat in that mailbox and learned how he wrote to his finance team: a customer name, an account number, an amount, and a one-word confirmation back. Then they copied the pattern and sent a test payment comfortably under $1,000. It cleared. The amounts climbed until the CEO noticed the balance looked wrong and asked for a transaction list, and finance sent back the emails he had supposedly written. One personal exception, and the business almost missed payroll; every other control was in good shape. Two things follow for your firm. The exception here was the CEO's, the account finance took payment instructions from, and that is where this landed. And if an account is ever compromised, changing the password does not sign the attacker out. The active sessions have to be revoked first, or the reset closes a ticket while the intruder keeps working. The full chain and the identity controls that break it: Identity Hardening Controls That Blunt ClickFix and Credential Abuse.
Huntress and AnyDesk's fraud team traced a set of scam call-center operations, several of them in Kolkata, running their fraud through the same remote monitoring and management software an IT company uses: cracked, self-hosted ScreenConnect servers resold to other crews as branded subdomains, alongside AnyDesk. The way onto the victim's machine is a conversation. Matt Caldwell, AnyDesk's director of fraud prevention, got the lure in his own inbox: a fake Pepsi recruiter asking him to download a meeting app for the interview. The app was a cracked remote-control client. The attack needs only a believable reason to run an installer and a pretext the target would rather not mention to anyone who might stop it. Huntress puts remote-access-tool abuse up 277% last year and finds it in almost 40% of the incidents its response team investigates, which makes it the number one threat they track across roughly five million endpoints.
The reason it works is that a rogue install is identical to a legitimate one: the same signed installer from the vendor, the same folder on disk, the same connection back to the vendor's relay servers. Antivirus has nothing to object to. In one case Huntress worked, a user clicked a ScreenConnect lure in February and the operator didn't sign in until July. The tool sat there for five months, because a remote-access client on a business PC doesn't look out of place. When the operator finally connected, they worked inside the user's own session: the browser, the mailbox, new inbox rules to hide replies, and a run of spam from the firm's own domain pushing a second remote tool at new targets. That outbound mail is what tripped the alert.
Now think about what's on the screen of the person who takes that call at your practice: the bank portal, the payment approval queue, the one-time code they type while the operator watches, patient or client records open in another window. If a wire goes out from a session your own employee started, the bank has a strong argument that the instruction was legitimate, and the loss tends to stay with you. And if regulated records were visible during the session, your counsel may have to treat that as access to the data, which can put you into notification territory with nothing copied. The fix starts with a decision: name the one remote-support tool your IT provider uses, and treat any other one on a workstation as an incident. The detection and response sequence is in the full breakdown: Attackers Abuse AnyDesk and ScreenConnect RMM Tools for Remote Access.
Socket's researchers identified nineteen browser extensions, eighteen in the Chrome Web Store and one in Microsoft's Edge store, carrying code that steals credentials, session cookies, and cryptocurrency wallet data. The crypto angle gets the headline and probably doesn't touch your practice. The mechanism does. The operator built fourteen of the extensions from scratch and bought the other five from their original developers, and those five had real users and worked exactly as advertised until a new version arrived with the payload. The largest, Enable Right Click & Copy, has about 80,000 users across Chrome and Edge. Chrome updates extensions automatically by default, so the poisoned build landed on every one of those users with no click, no warning, and no new permission prompt.
Once active, the code strips the security headers from every page the browser loads and injects its own scripts: a form grabber that captures whatever gets typed into any login page, account stealers for Facebook and LinkedIn, a browser-history collector, and a fake browser-update prompt that walks the user through pasting a command, the same trick as the first story. An extension with access to all sites reads the authenticated pages your staff already have open, which means whatever they're signed into: practice management, webmail, the payroll portal. No password is needed, because the extension is inside the session. We flagged a banned extension that had reappeared in the Web Store in the August 15 briefing; this is the same lesson at scale. A store listing tells you an extension was clean when it was reviewed and nothing about who owns it now. Removal from the store doesn't uninstall it from the machines that already have it, and no signal fires anywhere when a developer sells. The durable fix is an allowlist on managed devices, so nothing installs or updates without someone looking at it first. All nineteen extension IDs and the removal steps: 19 Malicious Chrome and Edge Extensions Steal Wallet Data and Drain Crypto.
GTG-1002 Abuses Claude Code While EchoLeak Hits Microsoft 365 Copilot — the half of this that matters for a practice is EchoLeak: a single crafted email, read by Microsoft 365 Copilot during a routine summary, pulled data out of OneDrive, SharePoint, and Teams with nobody clicking anything (rated 9.3 out of 10). Microsoft fixed it on their side. What they didn't fix is that Copilot reads everything the user's account can technically open, including the shared folders nobody remembers granting access to, so if you've turned it on, the permissions cleanup comes first.
Rhysida Ransomware Hits Berlin State Network as City Refuses to Pay — Berlin refused, and the operators posted a claim of 5.79 terabytes across roughly 1.44 million files. The route documented for this group includes a Microsoft domain-controller flaw patched in August 2020 that still works wherever the fix was installed but the enforcement setting was never switched on, so a patch report can say done and be wrong. Seven days passed between the first reported outflow and the network being cut off; decide now who in your firm makes the pay-or-don't call, so nobody is working it out that week.
DPRK IT Workers Tied to FAMOUS CHOLLIMA Use Astrill VPN and IPRoyal Proxy — Huntress has helped identify five suspected North Korean nationals hired into partner companies so far this year, in IT, sales and marketing, and medicine. Nobody broke in; HR sent the offer letter and IT shipped the laptop. The tell in one case was a new hire who wouldn't turn the camera on or show the room. If you hire remote staff, cameras on for every interview round, and ship equipment only to an address you've verified yourself.
One Thing to Do This Week
Say this at your next staff meeting, out loud, and have people repeat it back: "If anything you didn't go looking for asks you to paste a command into Windows or install a remote-access app, whether it's a web page checking you're human, a recruiter, or a caller who says they're IT support, close it and tell me before you do anything else." Two of this week's three attacks fail at that sentence. It takes thirty seconds and needs no help from IT.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read — what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms — medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial — since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
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