Weekly Briefing • November 20, 2026
SonicWall told customers on Wednesday to take every Generation 6 firewall out of service. Support for those models has already ended, so they get no more security fixes, even for critical flaws. SonicWall expects attackers to go after the ones still facing the internet. Google reported finding an AI tool that compares web software before and after a security update, looks for the flaw the update fixed, then drafts and runs an exploit with no person in the loop. And Microsoft described a phishing campaign that sent fake outage notices offering to restore held email, the first of them arriving while its Microsoft 365 email outage was still going on, security vendors say.
The first two are about time. A published fix shows attackers where the hole was, and the time they need to use it keeps shrinking. The third is about the moment your staff are most likely to click. Here's what happened, and what it means for how your firm operates.
On Wednesday, November 18, SonicWall told every customer still running a Generation 6 firewall to replace it immediately and stop using it at the edge of the network, where it faces the internet. This isn't a deadline coming up. Support for every Gen 6 and Gen 6.5 model has already ended. The small TZ and SOHO units common in offices lost it between January 2025 and October 1 of this year, and SonicWall's advisory lists every model and its date. SonicWall no longer releases firmware updates or security patches for them, even for flaws it rates Critical, and support can no longer be bought or renewed. It expects the Gen 6 units still facing the internet to be actively targeted, and says to treat any still in service as a high-risk exposure. SonicWall's Gen 7 firewalls aren't covered by this notice and received security fixes this month.
A firewall sits at the edge of your network, and in many small offices it also runs the VPN staff use to work from home, so it is the first thing an attacker on the internet can reach. SonicWall's warning is that when one flaw affects several generations, the supported models get a fix and Gen 6 doesn't, and the public advisory for that fix tells attackers where to look. It points to CVE-2024-40766, a critical 2024 flaw in the firewall's management access and SSL VPN that affected Gen 5 and Gen 6 firewalls and Gen 7 firewalls running older firmware. Most Gen 6 models were still supported then and got a fix. CISA lists the flaw as used in ransomware campaigns. At the time, Arctic Wolf reported that Akira ransomware attackers got in on unpatched firewalls through VPN accounts set up on the firewall itself, with multi-factor authentication turned off. A Gen 6 unit would get no fix for a flaw like that today.
Key Insight
A firewall that no longer gets fixes doesn't fail the day support ends. It fails the first time someone finds a flaw in it, and from then on the hole stays open.
Start by finding every firewall your firm runs. The One Thing to Do at the end of this briefing shows how. Any Gen 6 unit needs replacing with a firewall that still gets security updates, starting with the units that face the internet or run remote access. SonicWall recommends its current Gen 8 models, and a supported firewall from another maker is also an option. Until the replacement is in, SonicWall lists interim steps for whoever manages the firewall. Turn off management access from the internet, and turn off the SSL VPN or limit it to known addresses. Require multi-factor authentication on every remaining remote access and administrator account, and reset the firewall's local passwords. Turn off services you don't use, and watch the logs for unusual sign-ins and configuration changes. SonicWall is clear that these steps reduce the exposure but don't make an unsupported firewall secure. For a practice under HIPAA or a firm under the FTC Safeguards Rule, a firewall that can no longer be patched may also be hard to defend in a risk analysis. Ask whoever manages your firewall for the replacement plan in writing, with a date. If staff work from home through that VPN, ask in the same request how they will connect if it is turned off before the new firewall is in. That includes us: if Capstone manages your firewall, ask us the same questions.

Google Threat Intelligence Group reported on Monday, November 16, that in the past quarter it saw attackers use AI frameworks to automate both finding and exploiting software flaws with no human involved, the first time it had seen that. One tool, which Google calls exploit_agent, sat on an exposed server. It keeps comparing versions of popular web application software from before and after a patch is announced, looks for the flaw the patch fixed, drafts an exploit and runs it automatically. The one product Google shows it examining is a WordPress plugin. The same server held stolen victim data and scripts for guessing passwords and planting webshells, small programs that give an attacker a way back into a website. The victims appear to be French media and entertainment websites and the education sector. Google hasn't said who ran it, and the tool's own settings file calls it a pilot.
Google says chaining AI tools this way lets attackers sharply shorten the time between a published patch and a working exploit, because the patch narrows where to look. Google's other examples, one from this report and one from a September report, show how short that time already is. Four days after a pair of PaperCut print management flaws were disclosed, GreyNoise saw a likely AI-assisted campaign against hundreds of organizations, and in a separate case one group exploited a flaw in BeyondTrust's remote support software within four days of disclosure. These flaws already had fixes. What matters now is how quickly they go on.
Many firms like yours run the kind of software Google describes. That usually means a website, often WordPress with a handful of plugins maintained by an outside agency, and often a patient or client portal, a remote access tool or a print server that can be reached from the internet. Ask whoever handles your IT and your website for a written list of everything your firm has that faces the internet, who updates each one, and how soon after release a critical security update goes on. Waiting for a monthly maintenance window, or for the web agency to get to it, leaves a published hole open well past the four days in Google's examples. So agree in writing how many days a critical update can wait for each item on that list. Our full analysis: what Google found and what it means for your patching.

Last week's briefing warned that outages make fake help more convincing. This week Microsoft described a phishing campaign built around that very outage. The Exchange Online outage ran from 11:20 AM Eastern on Thursday, November 12, to 11:10 AM on Friday, November 13, and Microsoft's preliminary report says it wasn't caused by a cyberattack. Microsoft says it saw the campaign, aimed at organizations across many sectors, on November 13, and email security company Fortra says the emails began reaching inboxes early that day, while the outage was still going on. The emails posed as Microsoft 365 service-health notices and quoted EX1550543, the real incident number Microsoft used for the outage. They said held messages would be deleted within 24 hours unless the recipient clicked a button marked RESTORE MESSAGES or TAKE ACTION. The link, unique to each recipient, led to a site outside Microsoft. Microsoft calls it likely credential phishing, an attempt to collect usernames and passwords, and says its evidence doesn't confirm that any were captured. Fortra also says the page showed an Office 365 sign-in screen and that some samples reached Microsoft 365 inboxes despite Microsoft's built-in filtering.
Here is the one fact your staff need. Microsoft's report says it held delayed mail instead of bouncing it and delivered everything that queued during the outage. No real message needed a button to bring it back, so every email asking someone to sign in to rescue mail held during the outage was fake. The sender names looked official, such as "MSF Outage Notification" or "AMZ Service Health," but the addresses behind them had nothing to do with Microsoft. Most subject lines were "Outage" followed by a random six-character code, so they changed from message to message, and related versions kept appearing, including one warning of a security issue on the account and a French-language lure that Mimecast saw on November 17. On an account without strong multi-factor authentication, one captured Microsoft 365 password can open a person's email and their SharePoint, OneDrive and Teams files. It can also let the attacker write to clients and vendors from a real account, which is how invoice and payment fraud often starts.
Ask whoever manages your Microsoft 365 to search mail since November 12 for every pattern Microsoft published, not just the "Outage" subject line, remove any copies still in mailboxes, and check who clicked. For anyone who may have entered a password, Microsoft's checklist is to reset it, sign the account out of every session and check which multi-factor methods are registered. Then look for new inbox or forwarding rules, app permissions and delegates, which can keep an attacker in after the password changes. Then tell staff where outage news comes from at your firm, such as a call from your IT contact or Microsoft's public status page, and that any email offering to restore held mail goes to IT, not to the button. Our full analysis: how the fake outage notices worked.
Coinbase Blocks $4.7 Million in Transfers to Elon Musk Deepfake Scam. Coinbase said on Tuesday that its automated defenses kept $4.7 million, about 91% of the money its customers tried to send, from reaching scammers who ran a fake YouTube livestream of Tesla's "flying car" demonstration. The stream showed an AI-generated deepfake of Elon Musk, wallet addresses and a QR code, and promised to double any cryptocurrency sent. Coinbase says more than half a million people watched, and in about two hours hundreds of its customers, many of them longtime users, tried to send money. Nobody was hacked. The customers logged in and pressed confirm themselves, and Coinbase notes that most fraud defenses are built to catch activity the customer didn't authorize. An office has the same blind spot whenever someone with real authority to pay approves a request they've been talked into, and a convincing video or voice call from a familiar face makes that easier. A rule that every new or changed payment request gets a call back on a number you already have on file, before any money moves, gives your office the same kind of pause Coinbase's system forced on its customers.
Single Pull Request Could Have Compromised Microsoft's Software Supply Chain. Security firm Cycode disclosed on Wednesday a flaw in the public catalog behind WinGet, Microsoft's tool for installing software on Windows. One crafted pull request, a proposed change to that catalog, could have exposed a Microsoft moderator's GitHub access token without anyone clicking anything. The flaw was in a script moderators run on their own computers to check submissions, which attached the moderator's token to every web request wherever it was going. Cycode says a stolen token could have been used to publish backdoored installers to 14,000 packages. Microsoft fixed the script on October 19, and CSO Online reports no evidence that anyone used the flaw. There is nothing for your office to patch. The lesson is about trust: if your IT provider installs or updates software through WinGet or a similar catalog, a tampered package would arrive looking like an approved package from an approved source, as analyst Frank Dickson put it. Ask them which software catalogs they install from on your computers, and whether a new version goes to one test machine before it reaches every computer in your office.
One Thing to Do This Week
Find out the make and model of the firewall at each of your locations, including any spare in a closet and the small unit at a home office if one connects to your network. The model name is printed on a label on the device and shown on its management page, and whoever manages it can tell you in a minute. If it is a SonicWall, check it against SonicWall's advisory, which lists each Gen 6 model and the date its support ended. If it is any other brand, ask whoever manages it whether that model still gets security updates, and until what date. Write down the model, the location and the date support ends, and for any firewall already past that date, get a replacement date from whoever manages it.
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Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms (medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial) since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
Weekly Briefing • November 13, 2026
Attackers took over the remote support accounts of at least six IT providers and used them to reach 286 devices at 47 of their client organizations. Since November 5, Microsoft has been rejecting some legitimate email sent to personal outlook.com, hotmail.com, live.com and msn.com addresses. And on Thursday, November 12, a failure inside Microsoft cut users in the Americas off from their Microsoft 365 email.
Each one started at a company your firm depends on, and only the first is known to be an attack. What your office controls is what happens next: whether anyone knows which remote access tools are on your computers, whether anyone reads the bounces, and whether staff know where to turn when email is down. Here's what happened, and what it means for how your firm operates.
Attackers took over ConnectWise ScreenConnect accounts belonging to at least six managed IT providers and used them to reach 286 devices across 47 of those providers' client organizations, according to security company Huntress, which says the count is still rising. ScreenConnect is a remote support tool: it is how a provider's technician sees a client's screen, runs commands and installs updates without being in the room. ConnectWise has confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and unauthorized remote access software at customers. Huntress doesn't yet know how the attackers got in, though its data points to stolen logins or hijacked technician sessions. It calls this misuse of the tool's normal features, not a flaw in its code.
Once inside, the attackers used ScreenConnect's own command feature to install extra copies of ScreenConnect that answer to them, not to the provider, so they can keep a way in even if the provider's access changes. ConnectWise suspects more software went in through five add-ons with names that read like ordinary IT tools. It has switched those off for providers on its cloud service, and warns that doing so doesn't clean up anything already installed. It is also checking reports that a technician's own computer was compromised during a remote session with an infected client computer. A technician's computer usually holds access to many clients, so one infected client computer could become a way into the rest.
Key Insight
Whoever takes over an IT provider's account gets the same reach into your computers that the provider has, and from your office it looks like routine support.
Two recent briefings asked you to list the outsiders who can reach your systems: on October 23, the apps connected to your Microsoft 365, and on November 6, the people outside your staff who can sign in to your records system. This week's outsider is your IT provider, whose access reaches every computer it supports. Most of the records that would show an attacker at work, such as the command history and sign-in logs, sit in the provider's systems, so you depend on the provider to tell you what happened, and it may still be working that out.
So put three questions to the company that manages your computers, in writing. Do you use ScreenConnect or any of the five add-ons ConnectWise flagged, and what did a review of your logs, going back several months, find? Which remote access tools are installed on our computers, and whose server does each one report to? And does the system your technicians use to reach our computers require multi-factor authentication, a second sign-in step such as a code on a phone, so a stolen password alone can't open it? ConnectWise says an add-on being installed doesn't by itself mean a compromise. Any tool that reports to neither the provider nor a vendor you've approved needs a written explanation. Then check whether your agreement says how quickly the provider must tell you if its own systems or tools are compromised, and if it doesn't, ask for that in writing. That includes us: if Capstone manages your computers, ask us the same questions. Full analysis here: ScreenConnect Attacks Breach MSPs and Impact Dozens of Organizations.

Since November 5, Microsoft's consumer email service has been rejecting some legitimate messages sent to personal addresses ending in outlook.com, hotmail.com, live.com and msn.com, the kind of address many patients and clients use. Most of the rejected mail comes from domains that don't publish a DMARC record, an entry in a domain's DNS settings that tells receiving mail servers what to do with mail that fails the checks confirming who sent it. Microsoft has required DMARC since May 2025, but only from domains that send more than 5,000 messages a day to its consumer mailboxes. These rejections are hitting small senders far below that. Microsoft hasn't announced a policy change or posted a notice. A moderator listed as Microsoft external staff called it a "service degradation" under investigation, and nothing in the reporting points to an attack.
A rejected message never reaches the recipient's inbox or junk folder. The patient waiting on an appointment confirmation, or the client waiting on a document request, never learns it was sent, and your sent folder still shows it as sent. The only record is on the sender's side, usually a bounce in the sender's inbox with wording such as "hotmail.com couldn't confirm that your message was sent from a trusted location," and a bounce full of codes reads like a glitch. For a law or accounting firm, a bounced engagement letter or filing reminder can let a deadline pass while your firm believes the notice went out. Mail your systems send on their own is especially exposed: appointment reminders, e-signature requests and billing statements often go out through an outside service under your name, and nobody reads those bounces.
Ask whoever manages your domain's DNS records, often your IT provider or whoever built your website, to check that your domain, and any other domain or subdomain your outside services send from, publishes a DMARC record. Where one is missing, Frank Dickson of Dickson Research says a monitoring-only record, one that asks receiving servers to send reports and take no action on mail that fails, stops these bounces as long as one of the other two email authentication records, SPF or DKIM, lines up with the domain in the From line. It may not fix every case: some domains with all three records working were reportedly rejected too. If DKIM signing was never turned on for your domain in Microsoft 365, turn it on. Two things to avoid: rewriting your SPF record because a bounce blames SPF, unless someone finds an actual error in it, and loosening your own filtering to get mail through. Loosening it does nothing for mail you send, stays in place after Microsoft fixes this, and weakens the filtering that stops forged mail aimed at your staff. Full analysis here: Microsoft Email Security Blocks Legitimate Business Mail Unexpectedly.

On Thursday, November 12, users in the Americas lost their connection to Exchange Online, the system behind Microsoft 365 email. Microsoft warned of potential disruption to Teams, SharePoint, Copilot and many other services. It said a large number of its servers had become unavailable, and it began rolling back a network configuration change that coincided with the start, without saying the change caused the outage. The disruption continued into Friday. As of Microsoft's Thursday evening update, restarting affected servers was showing signs of improvement, but Microsoft had not confirmed full recovery. Its status page says: "At this time, we have no evidence of malicious activity associated with this incident."
Your firm couldn't have prevented this outage. What your firm controlled was what people did during it. Staff who can't send email tend to move the work to personal email, text messages or a consumer chat app, and those conversations land outside your firm's records, outside any legal hold, and outside the protections you're responsible for on patient and client information. Outages also make fake help more convincing: emails claiming to be from Microsoft or IT, and phone calls offering to restore access. Separately, Microsoft's November updates, released two days before the outage, fixed CVE-2026-124194, an Outlook flaw Microsoft says attackers have already used: opening a specially crafted file in an affected version of Outlook can expose information an attacker can use to pose as that user. Microsoft hasn't linked it to the outage, but an attachment promising to fix your mailbox is a realistic way to deliver one.
Three things to settle before the next one. Ask whoever handles your IT whether Outlook on every computer has the November updates. Decide your fallback: who tells staff what's down and when to expect the next update, by phone tree or group text with no patient or client details, and how clients and patients will hear from you. And give staff two rules for any outage. Client and patient work moves to the phone or waits, never to personal email or texts. And any email asking them to re-verify an account or open an attachment to restore their mail gets ignored, as does any call offering the same help. Full analysis here: Microsoft 365 Outage Disrupts Outlook, Exchange Online and Teams Users.
Attacker Uses Stolen Qubole Credentials to Breach Customers' AWS Environments. Between October 14 and 26, someone holding stolen credentials for Qubole, a data analytics company, used the access Qubole's customers had granted it to get into their Amazon Web Services accounts, including access that had gone unused. The attacker downloaded everything that access could reach, collected 100 stored passwords and keys in seven minutes, and confirmed that some still worked, including app keys for Microsoft Entra ID and Okta, the services that control sign-in to other business applications. Sentra, one of the security companies investigating, confirmed dozens of victims, and one lost millions of files. Most firms reading this don't have their own Amazon Web Services account, but the lesson is the one from October 23: access you grant a vendor stays open until someone removes it, whether or not the vendor still uses it.
Fake Security Tools on GitHub Push Backdoors and Infostealers. Researchers at Dr. Web found more than 2,000 Windows computers infected by a campaign, running for about two years, that now hides its malware in GitHub projects posing as security tools. Building or running one installs a backdoor and a program that steals browser data and VPN settings, and the targets now are security researchers and IT staff, the people who usually hold administrator rights and VPN access. Ask whoever handles your IT, inside the firm or outside it, where they run tools downloaded from GitHub. The right answer is a separate, disposable test machine with no saved logins and no connection to your office systems. A laptop that has run one of these tools can't be trusted to report on itself, because the malware tries to uninstall three common antivirus products and switches off some of Windows' own protections, so it gets rebuilt, and every login used on it gets changed from a different, clean computer.
One Thing to Do This Week
Ask everyone who emails patients or clients to search Outlook, in all folders and in any shared mailbox such as the front desk's, for "Undeliverable" in messages received since November 5 (on Google Workspace, search for "Delivery Status Notification"), looking only at bounces for mail sent to outlook.com, hotmail.com, live.com or msn.com addresses. Don't forward the bounces around the office. Have each person write down the date, the address and what the message was. For anything with a deadline or a bill attached, call the patient or client on the number in your records, confirm who you're speaking with, and either handle it on the call or send it by mail or through your portal if you have one, never from personal email or a text. Ask the services that send your reminders, statements or e-signature requests whether they've seen the same rejections. Then tell whoever manages your email which of your addresses or services the rejected mail was sent from, with nothing from the messages themselves. Finding and fixing the missed messages needs no help from IT.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read: what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms (medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial) since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
Weekly Briefing • November 6, 2026
Blossom Health, a telepsychiatry provider, says an attacker reached its electronic health record system by phishing a contractor and then using that contractor's access. Security company Check Point found a way around Lockdown Mode, the optional ChatGPT setting meant to stop hidden instructions from sending a conversation out of the app. The way around was a different feature, and what could go out was whatever had been typed or pasted into the chat. And in a Barracuda survey of 2,000 IT and security decision-makers, 67% said their security teams are struggling to keep up with what the business needs.
In the October 23 briefing, the way in was an app connected to Microsoft 365. This week it is a person outside the practice with access to the records. All three stories are about protection you rely on but can't see from your desk: the security of someone else's inbox, a feature inside a vendor's app, and the routine work of keeping logins and updates in order, which tends to be the first work to slip when people are stretched.
The HIPAA Journal's November 4 roundup covered four healthcare breaches. Blossom Health says that in August an attacker phished one of its contractors and used that person's access to get into its electronic health record software. From there the attacker downloaded a limited number of medical records and a spreadsheet of patient names, contact details and insurance information. At El Camino Health, four compromised Microsoft 365 accounts were enough to expose documents covering patients' identity, treatment and finances. HCA Healthcare confirmed unauthorized access to some of its IT systems on August 12, and the attacker copied patient records from affiliated facilities and physician offices. HCA has reported 15,096 affected Texas residents to the Texas attorney general and Blossom 2,103, and neither has said how many people were affected in all.
Key Insight
Every login you give someone outside your firm makes their inbox and their training part of your security.
For any firm that holds patient or client records, the Blossom route is the one to look at. Billing services, medical coders, transcription services, consultants and IT providers can all hold logins to a health record or practice management system, and at a law or accounting firm the same goes for case management, document management and tax software. Each of those logins can be phished through someone else's inbox. Require multi-factor authentication, the second step at sign-in, on every outside login, and put a date on the calendar to check that each one is still needed. Under HIPAA, a business associate has to tell you about a breach it discovers, but the duty to notify your patients stays with you.
Paying a ransom doesn't change that duty. The Medusa ransomware group claimed one of the four, the University of Mississippi Medical Center, where attackers were inside the network from February 11 to February 19 and then demanded payment to keep the stolen data from being sold or published. UMMC didn't pay, and paying wouldn't have changed its duty to notify patients: the data was already taken, and a payment buys only a criminal's promise to delete it, which nobody can check. HCA and Blossom have not named an attacker, and the reporting doesn't tie either one to Medusa. Working out what was taken took UMMC until October 20, eight months after it identified the intrusion.
This is the fourth briefing since October 2 to come back to the outsiders who hold your records. On October 23 the list was every outside business that touches your patient data. This week it is every person outside your staff who can sign in to your systems. Full analysis here: the four healthcare breaches and what the reporting confirms.

Lockdown Mode is an optional ChatGPT setting OpenAI introduced in June. It is meant to stop hidden instructions, planted by an attacker in something ChatGPT reads, from sending your conversation somewhere else. Check Point found a way around it through a feature the setting didn't cover. ChatGPT can show web page code from a chat as a working preview, and while ChatGPT blocked that preview from opening pop-up windows directly, it missed one route. A pop-up opened that way ran outside the limits of both the preview and Lockdown Mode, and could send the conversation to a server the attacker controlled.
The attacker's content had to get into the chat first, through a prompt someone pastes in, a custom version of ChatGPT the attacker set up, or a shared chat. Once it was there, the conversation could go out from the desktop app with no click, approval or notice. Check Point says the weakness itself wasn't limited to the desktop app. The same pop-up could also show a fake ChatGPT update to get the user to download malware. A separate flaw in the same preview feature let a public ChatGPT share link take over the account of whoever opened it, with one click. It was reported a week before Check Point's disclosure, and the reporting doesn't say when it was fixed.
OpenAI fixed the Lockdown Mode bypass on September 18. The reporting doesn't say whether the desktop app needed an update to get the fix, so make sure everyone's copy is current. The fix closed the route. It didn't empty anyone's chat history: if your staff use ChatGPT, whatever they have pasted in to draft a letter or summarize a document stays there unless it's deleted, and that can include patient details, a client's file or a password.
A safety setting tells you what the vendor meant to stop. What goes into the tool is your firm's call. Write down what must never be pasted into an AI tool, and tell staff two things: don't open ChatGPT links sent from outside the firm, which is how the share-link flaw worked, and never install a ChatGPT update offered by a pop-up or a link during a chat. If patient information has gone into a chat, raise it with whoever handles HIPAA for your practice, because HIPAA obligations may apply. For a law firm, a chat history full of client material is a client-confidentiality question before it is a technical one, and an accounting firm's client files raise the same question. Full analysis here: ChatGPT Lockdown Mode Bypass Exfiltrates Chats Without User Interaction.

Security company Barracuda surveyed 2,000 IT and security decision-makers, and 67% said their security teams are under pressure and struggling to keep up with what the business needs. Half said their security staff are expected to support growing digital operations with no added resources. AI-related risks were the challenge respondents cited most often, at 68%.
If IT at your firm is one person who also handles everything else, the squeeze is the same. The work that slips first when people are stretched is the work that produces nothing anyone sees: installing updates, working through alerts, checking who still has access, and reviewing settings. That's how a contractor's login outlives the contract. So make it visible. Ask whoever handles your IT, inside the firm or outside it, for three numbers: computers still waiting on updates, accounts for people who have left or no longer need access, and outside apps that have been allowed into your Microsoft 365 email, calendar or files but never reviewed. For each, ask how long the oldest item has been waiting. The third is the app list the October 23 briefing asked for. If nobody can give you the numbers, nobody is tracking the work. Full analysis here: 67% of Security Leaders Say Their Teams Struggle to Meet Business Needs.
Gabagool, Mir0Auth and 3 More Threats Put US Enterprises at Risk in October 2026. One of last week's leads was SkyW4lker: a message takes your employee to Microsoft's real sign-in page to enter a code, and entering it signs the attacker in to that employee's account. The October roundup from ANY.RUN, a malware-analysis company, lists three phishing kits and services built on that same device-code sign-in: SkyW4lker (with lures posing as contracts, invoices and proposals), GeorgeGinx (which starts from a genuine Adobe shared link) and Mir0Auth (which starts from a PDF that leads to a fake DocuSign page). Three on one method is why last week's question matters, so ask whoever handles your IT whether this kind of sign-in is blocked for everyone who doesn't need it. The same roundup describes WKLP, malicious software that tells Microsoft Defender, the antivirus built into Windows, to skip it. A running antivirus is not the same as an antivirus that's looking.
Trojanized Claude Code Extension v2.1.313 Targets Cursor Developers. For 11 hours on October 29, developers who installed or updated Anthropic's Claude Code extension in the Cursor code editor received a tampered version 2.1.313, and Cursor says at most 5,000 users were affected. It wasn't a lookalike. The real listing was hijacked, so the name, branding and publisher all looked right, and code-editing programs set to update automatically pulled it in without asking. It sent the attacker details identifying each machine and its user. On a computer where it had administrator rights, which Cursor says was highly unusual, it could also have opened a lasting backdoor. Most firms reading this don't write software, but many pay someone who does, for a website or a custom integration, and that person's laptop may hold logins to your systems. Ask whether they use Cursor and whether the extension was installed or updated on October 29. If it was, ask what they have done since, and have the passwords changed for any of your systems they sign in to from that laptop.
One Thing to Do This Week
Open the user list in the system that holds your patient or client records (your health record, practice management, case management, document management or tax software) and write down every login that belongs to someone who isn't on your staff today: a billing service, a medical coder, a consultant, an IT provider, a former employee. Next to each, write who it is and whether they still need it. If you can't see the list yourself, ask the software vendor for it. Before any login nobody can account for is switched off, ask the vendor to confirm it isn't one the software itself uses, such as a connection to a lab, a clearinghouse or a bank. Blossom Health's attacker got in through a contractor's access. Making the list needs no help from IT. Switching anything off waits for the vendor's answer.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read: what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms (medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial) since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
Weekly Briefing • October 30, 2026
Each of this week's attacks passes the check your staff were taught to make. The "IT support" offering to fix a flooded inbox arrives inside Microsoft Teams, where no email filter ever sees it. The contract leads to a sign-in page that really is Microsoft's, and your own employee answers the MFA prompt. And the typos and clumsy phrasing that awareness training has taught people to look for are missing from phishing written with AI.
Since September, the One Thing at the bottom of this briefing has four times been a version of one rule: confirm on a number you already have. Before resetting a password or MFA (September 11). Before paying an invoice or changing where a payment goes (September 18). From a printed phone list instead of a search result (October 2). Instead of the number printed in an order confirmation (last week). This week's reporting explains why those are one rule, and adds two places it now has to reach. Here's what happened, and what it means for how your firm operates.
Arctic Wolf published research on October 26 covering more than 400 incidents in which attackers used Microsoft Teams to message employees while posing as their IT help desk. Many begin in the inbox. Hundreds of newsletter and subscription confirmations arrive within minutes, a tactic called mail bombing, and moments later a Teams chat or call from "IT support" offers to fix the problem the attacker just created. The caller talks the employee into opening Quick Assist, the remote-help tool built into Windows, and the attacker's code was running on the computer in under 15 minutes from the moment the employee engaged with the first message. For access that outlasts the call, the attackers then install AnyDesk or ScreenConnect, commercial remote-support products many offices already allow. Arctic Wolf did not name who is behind these incidents. Ransomware groups including Black Basta have used the same way in before.
Nothing here exploits a flaw. Teams external access is on by default, so anyone in another organization's Microsoft 365 can find, chat with and call your staff as long as both sides allow it, and the conversation never passes through the email filtering that catches phishing. The attackers create their own Microsoft 365 accounts with names built from words like support, IT, helpdesk or admin, sometimes with 365 on the end, and in 30 to 40 percent of cases they used the default onmicrosoft.com address every new account starts with, which takes minutes to set up. A display name like "IT Service Desk, Liam" does the rest.
The attack works because it asks your staff to do what they have been told to do: cooperate with IT, follow instructions during a support session, and accept remote help when something breaks. Someone whose inbox has just filled with junk is not going to stop and read a sender's domain in a chat window. Two changes close most of it. The first is yours: decide how real IT support reaches your staff, write it down, and tell everyone that a "help desk" turning up in a Teams chat or call they did not ask for gets a call to the IT number you already have before anything else happens. The second is a question for whoever manages your Microsoft 365: can any organization in the world start a Teams chat with your staff, or only the outside firms you actually work with? Limiting it to those firms is the main change, and restricting Quick Assist and blocking remote-support tools your IT provider has not approved takes away the hands-on access the rest of the attack depends on. Full analysis here: Black Basta Exploits Teams External Chat to Breach Networks in Under 15 Minutes.

ANY.RUN has documented a campaign it calls Skyw4lker, aimed mainly at organizations in the United States and focused on healthcare, manufacturing and technology companies. The lure is a password-protected document presented as a contract or a service proposal, with the password in the message. Many file scanners cannot open an encrypted document, so the link inside it reaches the recipient without being inspected. The link leads to a page on Google Sites, which makes web filters that block new or low-reputation sites less likely to flag it, and from there into a genuine Microsoft sign-in. ANY.RUN has not said who is behind it, when it started, or how many organizations it has reached.
Device-code phishing led this briefing on August 21. The attacker starts a Microsoft sign-in meant for equipment like a meeting-room display, and your employee finishes it by entering a code on Microsoft's real page and approving the MFA prompt. The tokens go to the attacker, and your logs record an ordinary successful sign-in. What is new is the wrapper. A contract with its password in the message looks like routine vendor practice, and it is built for the people who handle contracts and vendor paperwork.
In August the advice was a habit for staff: a real device shows you its code, and nobody sends you one. This week the better answer removes the question. In many offices this kind of sign-in is needed only for a short list of shared devices, if any, so ask whoever manages your Microsoft 365 whether it is blocked for everyone else. A block stops new sign-ins but does not cancel access already handed out, so in the same conversation ask for a check of past sign-ins of this kind. For a medical practice, someone else reading a mailbox full of referrals and billing can count as a reportable breach under HIPAA, and working out what was read starts from a sign-in your logs recorded as valid. Full analysis here: Skyw4lker Device Code Phishing Campaign Targets American Organizations.

This month's Cybersecurity Awareness Month coverage from Dark Reading, TechTarget and Cybersecurity Dive comes back to one point about training: most programs were built to teach warning signs that generative AI removes. Misspellings, generic greetings, awkward grammar and slightly-off links were the lesson. Attackers now use AI to write fluent, personal messages at scale, clone voices, and stage video and chat impersonations. The editors pointed to deepfakes aimed at help desks to get MFA reset, and to the Arup case, in which an employee was on a call with someone presenting as the CFO who asked for a large wire transfer. A SANS report found that 19% of organizations run awareness training designed mainly to meet a compliance or audit requirement.
Key Insight
Your staff can no longer tell a real request from a fake one by how it looks or sounds. They can still tell what it is asking for, and that is what should trigger the check.
The answer in the coverage is to stop asking people to decide whether something seems fake, and to teach instead that certain kinds of request always get confirmed through a separate channel: moving money, changing payment details, resetting a password or MFA, and sharing sensitive data. The kind of request triggers the check, however polished, urgent or familiar the sender seems. That is the rule behind every callback this briefing has given you since September, and this week adds two requests to the list: someone offering to take control of a computer, and anything that asks you to type a code into a Microsoft page. It also changes what whatever training your staff get should measure. The number that matters is not how many people clicked a test email but how many reported it, and how fast. And the rule only holds if it binds the people at the top, so say out loud that it applies to requests that come from you. Full analysis here: Rethinking Cybersecurity Awareness in the AI Era and What Must Change.
Police Seize Virtualine Bulletproof Service Tied to Ransomware and StealC. The FBI seized Virtualine's main web address, and Dutch police seized dozens of its servers and recovered data on more than 3,000 of its customers. Virtualine rented servers to criminals and ignored abuse complaints, and blockchain analysts tied its payments to ransomware operators and to the StealC infostealer. Taking the servers down does not take back what passed through them: passwords and session cookies stolen before the seizure keep working until someone changes them, and a quiet stretch after a takedown usually means the same customers are moving to a new host.
Huntress Managed ESPM Attack Reduction Disrupts ClickFix PowerShell Abuse. Huntress says ClickFix-style attacks through the Windows Run box now account for 31% of the endpoint detection signals its security operations center handles, and its 2026 threat report ties ClickFix and fake CAPTCHA pages to over half of all malware loader activity. The page, sometimes a hacked small-business website with a valid padlock, copies a command to the clipboard and tells the visitor to press Windows key + R, then Ctrl + V, then Enter. Huntress's new control blocks the Run box for people who have never used it, and attackers already send victims to File Explorer's address bar or Windows Terminal instead. The rule for staff fits on a sticky note: a real CAPTCHA never asks you to paste anything.
One Thing to Do This Week
At your next staff meeting, say this: "If your inbox suddenly fills with sign-up and newsletter emails, that isn't the problem. It's the setup. The next thing will be a Teams message or call from 'IT support' offering to fix it. Don't answer it, and don't open anything it asks you to open. Call IT on the number we already have." In the incidents Arctic Wolf studied, the attackers went from that first message to running their own code on the computer in under 15 minutes, so the rule has to be in place before the flood starts. If you printed the phone list from the October 2 briefing, the IT number on it is the one to call. This one needs no help from IT.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that actually mattered into one short read: what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms (medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial) since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
Weekly Briefing • October 23, 2026
On October 15, someone holding a stolen credential for a Microsoft 365 backup app used it to sign in to at least 173 organizations' Microsoft 365 environments without typing a single password. Cisco Talos documented scammers getting Staples' and Dell's own order systems to deliver their phishing emails for them. And a Montana pharmacy disclosed that a website a third party built for it exposed prescription and insurance records for 258,920 customers.
Last week's briefing was about trust: the way in is usually something you already trusted. This week sharpens that. In all three stories, the check the victim relied on gave the right answer to the wrong question. Multi-factor authentication protects people signing in, and no person signed in. An app did. Email authentication confirmed the order confirmations came from Staples and Dell, and they did. The pharmacy's investigators confirmed its internal systems were untouched, and they were. The records were on the website.
On October 15, a stolen credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup, the Microsoft 365 backup service formerly sold as SkyKick, was used to sign in to at least 173 Microsoft 365 tenants, the organization-level accounts that hold a firm's email, files and Teams, according to Huntress. Every sign-in came from one internet address, working through the tenants a few seconds apart, which Huntress reads as a script running down a target list. By October 17 Huntress was seeing sign-in activity from the same address in almost 1,000 tenants, more than 300 of them successful, though not every successful sign-in gained access. Microsoft assesses that a China state-aligned group it tracks as Storm-0940 was responsible. ConnectWise suspended the service on October 17 and began restoring it in phases on October 21, a process it expects to take several days.
Nobody's password was involved. A backup app like this one is connected to an organization's Microsoft 365 by consent, granted by an IT provider or an in-house IT person when the service is set up, and that consent lets it reach mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams so it can copy them. The credential the app uses to exercise that access lived in ConnectWise's own systems. Whoever held it had the app's access in every tenant where the app was connected: no password, no MFA prompt, and nothing on the sign-in screen most people check, because app sign-ins are recorded on a separate tab. The same address had spent October 13 and 14 trying passwords against four law firms' Microsoft 365 accounts, with no successful sign-ins in Huntress's data. The front door held. The app's door was already open. In two tenants Huntress examined, a ConnectWise app then made itself a Global Administrator and planted new credentials on other apps, which is a way back in that does not depend on the stolen one. Huntress found no sign of mailboxes, files, users or policies being changed in either.
Key Insight
Multi-factor authentication protects the people who sign in to your Microsoft 365. It has nothing to say about the apps already connected to it, each holding whatever access someone granted it, often years ago.
For a medical, legal or accounting practice, the mailbox is where patient records, client files and invoice threads live, and Todyl's analysis says this app's access included reading and writing mail and attachments. Write access means a fake payment request can be placed inside a thread your billing staff already trusts. The harder problem is proof. Reads of the company directory through Microsoft Graph leave no entry in the standard audit log. Where reads of mail and files are logged, the records name the backup app, so Todyl could not tell the attacker's reads from the backup service's own. A firm may never be able to show what was or wasn't read. Under HIPAA, the notification clock starts when a breach is known, or would have been known with reasonable diligence, not when you can prove what was taken.
If someone outside your office manages your Microsoft 365, your exposure is set by the list of apps that provider has connected to your tenant and what each one is allowed to do, and most firms have never seen that list. Ask whoever manages your Microsoft 365 for it, along with who approved each app. If ConnectWise Cloud Backup is on it, even unused, you are in the group ConnectWise says should review its records, and Microsoft and Huntress both say to disable, not delete, any app nobody can account for. Full analysis here: Compromised ConnectWise Credential Used to Sign In to 173 Microsoft 365 Tenants.

Cisco Talos has documented scammers getting real companies' systems to send their phishing for them. In two campaigns, about 1,400 messages in all, the emails came from Staples' and Dell's own order systems: a Staples confirmation for an Apple iPad, and a Dell order for Microsoft Project Standard 2024 at $736.09. The scammers had typed their own text into fields the retailers' systems later printed into the email, so where the shipping and billing details should have been, the message said "Order Confirmed" and gave a "Helpline" number. There was no forged sender, no link and no attachment. SPF, DKIM and DMARC, the checks that confirm an email really came from the domain it names, all passed, because it really did. Talos counted abuse of more than 25 legitimate platforms over the past year, across collaboration, file-sharing, survey, payment and AI services.
The attack is the phone call. Someone at your front desk sees an order for an iPad nobody ordered and calls to cancel it, and the person who answers walks them into a payment, a password, or remote-access software that hands over a live session on a work computer. The call happens off your network, so there is no click, download or log entry for anything to catch, and the first anyone hears of it may be days later, when the employee mentions it. If someone on your staff has called a number from an email like this, treat it as an incident and pin down when the call happened, what the caller was given, and whether anything was installed. Those are the questions your cyber insurer will ask, and if nobody can fix a start date, counsel will generally advise notifying on the widest scope you can defend. Full analysis here: Attackers Parasitize Trusted Infrastructure to Deliver Malicious Payloads.

Ridgeway Pharmacy, a mail order and community pharmacy in Victor, Montana, has disclosed that its public website exposed names, addresses, dates of birth, prescription, health and insurance information for 258,920 customers, and payment card information for some of them, as reported by The HIPAA Journal. A third party designed and built the website, and investigators confirmed the incident was limited to it and that no internal systems were involved. The pharmacy learned of the exposure on August 21, has since moved to a new website platform, and offered affected customers credit monitoring. The same reporting covered two smaller cases: IMS Care Center, a Phoenix practice where someone was inside the email system on June 17 and 18 and was shut out on the second day, and a Minnesota dental practice where an intrusion from April 28 to April 30 exposed diagnosis, treatment, insurance and Social Security information for 3,386 patients.
This is the third briefing this month to land on the outside businesses that hold your records. On October 2 the point was that breach notification follows the data, not the server, and Ridgeway is that point again at a larger scale. What this week adds is time. IMS Care Center caught its intruder within a day, and its review still did not confirm that Social Security numbers and medical information were exposed until September 30. The letters went out October 16. The Minnesota practice's file review finished months after the intrusion. Fast detection shortened the attacker's window. It did not shorten the review, because the review is someone working out what was in the system, whose it was, and when that can be put in writing, and the notification deadlines, the state attorney general reports and the report to HHS's Office for Civil Rights all run off that answer.
The way to shorten it is to have the list before anything happens. For a medical or dental practice, that means every outside party that touches patient data: your website developer, any chat or analytics tool on your website, your reminder service, your claims clearinghouse and your IT provider. For each one, confirm you hold a current business associate agreement and know which records it can reach. Then stop keeping records you no longer need, because those are records you cannot lose. Full analysis here: Ridgeway Pharmacy Data Breach Affects 259,000 Individuals.
9 Rising Malware Trends Security Pros Should Know From ClickFix to Akira. Immersive puts infostealers such as Lumma Stealer, StealC and RisePro behind 75% of stolen credentials, and what they take is more than passwords: browser cookies, VPN logins and MFA tokens, packaged and sold on dark web markets to whoever is buying. The person who infects a laptop is often not the one who uses the login. Ransomware crews like Akira buy that access, take the data first and encrypt last. So an infostealer found on any computer means every account and signed-in session on that machine is compromised.
Kiloview E3 NDI Encoder Affected by Nine CVEs Including CVE-2026-105265. CISA published nine flaws on October 22 in a small hardware encoder that turns a camera feed into a network video stream, two of them rated 9.9 out of 10. Every unit signs its logins with the same built-in secret, so anyone with the public firmware can forge an administrator session. Kiloview's firmware 1.30 fixes all nine, and CISA reports no known exploitation. If your office streams or records meetings through dedicated video hardware, that box is a Linux computer, usually installed by an AV integrator, and nobody in IT may hold its password or update it. Find out who does.
One Thing to Do This Week
At your next staff meeting, say this: "If an email says we bought something we didn't, don't call the number in it. Look the company up on our account, or on the card we paid with, and call that number, or bring the email to me." The Staples and Dell emails in this week's briefing passed the authentication checks email systems run, so this is a rule only a person can follow. If you printed the phone list from the October 2 briefing, write this rule at the top of it. This one needs no help from IT.
Get the Monthly Briefing
Once a month I pull the threats that mattered into one short read: what happened, what it means for firms like yours, and the one thing worth doing about it. Subscribe using the form at the foot of this page.
Brian Sammons has managed IT environments for Ohio professional service firms (medical, dental, legal, accounting, and financial) since 2004. He writes the Weekly Briefing for the owners, administrators, and IT managers responsible for keeping those firms running: what happened in security this week, and what it means for yours.
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